2020 |
Cumulative innovation, open source, and distance to frontier |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2020 |
Drastic innovation reduces firms’ incentives to create divisions |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2019 |
Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2017 |
Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2017 |
Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2017 |
A dynamic model of open source vs proprietary R&D |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2016 |
Strictly convex variable cost does not imply U-shaped average cost |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2014 |
Competing R&D Joint Ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2011 |
R&D with spillovers: Monopoly versus noncooperative and cooperative duopoly. |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2009 |
Endogenous asymmetry and cooperative R&D in linear duopoly with spillovers |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2008 |
Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2008 |
Endogenous R&D Symmetry in linear duopoly with one-way spillovers |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2008 |
A further note on endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D duopoly |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2007 |
Un anno di Journal of Regional Science |
Recensione in rivista |
Vai |
2007 |
ENDOGENOUS FIRM ASYMMETRY VS SYMMETRY IN OLIGOPOLY MODELS |
Monografia |
Vai |
2007 |
Allocating cost reducing investments over competing divisions |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2007 |
Endogenous Timing with Free Entry |
Proceedings |
Vai |
2006 |
ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH FREE ENTRY |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2005 |
Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-Way Spillovers |
Proceedings |
Vai |
2005 |
ENDOGENOUS FIRM ASYMMETRY AND COOPERATIVE R&D IN LINEAR DUOPOLY WITH SPILLOVERS |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |
2005 |
ENDOGENOUS R&D SYMMETRY IN LINEAR DUOPOLY WITH ONE-WAY SPILLOVERS |
Articolo in rivista |
Vai |