Πίστις is said in many ways
- Authors: Di Piazza, Salvatore; Marian, Claudiu
- Publication year: 2023
- Type: Articolo in rivista
- OA Link: http://hdl.handle.net/10447/622855
Abstract
In this article, we will examine some aspects of the Greek notion of pistis (faith, persuasion, belief, confidence, trust, proof, etc.) in two very different fields: the religious one and the rhetorical and philosophical one. We will try to emphasize the rationality of religious pistis and to weaken, in a sense, the rationality of philosophical pistis. In short, we will try that: (1) the distinction between a rational/philosophical pistis (belief founded on rational arguments) and an irrational/religious pistis (belief founded on irrational arguments) is not valid from a theoretical point of view – and not applicable from a practical point of view; (2) the category rational/irrational is not useful to assess the epistemological status of a pistis/belief. To show this, we will refer to New Testament authors and Aristotle, who in some ways can be considered as representing specimens of these two (allegedly) opposite models of pistis.