Public contracts in Italy: the failure of the anti-pandemic investments

Abstract

Abstract Purpose – This paper describes and analyzes the complexity of the regulation and the stipulation of public contracts in Italy, focusing speci cally on the failure of recent anti-pandemic investments. This is of particular interest during a state of emergency when it should be avoided to waste public funds and to speculate. Everything shows how the regulations of public procurement a fects the realization of big investments, the use of public funds and the possibility for anyone to pursue criminal purposes. Design/methodology/approach – After an introduction focused on the EU legal framework on public contracts as implemented in the internal legislation, the paper will go deeper in evaluating the public investments made during the hardest moment of the pandemic, showing the extent to which the legislation gives chances to private and public subjects to speculate, to committing crimes or, at least, to realize wrong expenditures. Findings – this paper shows how a broader or tighter legislation could a fect the way public funds are used, and highlights the confusion between the ideas of simpli cation and emergency legislation in the public contracts matter. Originality/value – This work looks to the recent Italian experiences concerning the use of public funds during the pandemic emergency. This paper is addressing the most recent Italian pieces of legislation regarding public tender procedures and has not been submitted elsewhere for publication.