A garantia constitucional da Responsabilidade Gerencial no Brasil e na Itália

Abstract

Rule of Law presupposes the provision of efficient public services. In this context, the managerial liability of public administration is highlighted. The main sustained theoretical hypothesis states that the exercise of managerial positions by the high bureaucracy and to seek results with autonomy and with the power to plan and execute public policies is the appropriate way to relate politics and public administration. In Brazil, the managerial public administration model and accountability were introduced especially through State Reform in the nineties of the last century, by Constitutional Amendment no 19 of 2008 and currently by Federal Law no 13.934 of 2019. In turn, the analysis of the implementation of this modality of liability in the Italian legal system shows that the legislator has produced some inadequate regulations for a public administration focused on the high performance of the public machine, indicating the need to deepen the autonomy and the efficiency of management positions.