From bid-rigging to subcontracting: the Italian experience

Abstract

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to provide insights into bid rigging, especially when it meets the instrument of subcontracting. In particular, the Italian experience will be used to illustrate how said instrument can raise both competition and corruption problems when designing a sound public procurement regulation. Design/methodology/approach – This paper draws on reports, legal scholarship, and other open-source data to examine the legislative framework surrounding subcontracting and the issues related to bid rigging and corruption. This study also relies on the examination of some Italian cases showing the evolution of the Italian public procurement legislation in relation to the harmonization with EU sources of law. Findings – Subcontracting has been identi ed as an important instrument for facilitating broader participation in public procurement, especially for SMEs. However, subcontracting has been used for keeping bid rigging agreements alive and serves as a backdoor for corrupt practices as well. The Italian legislator has restricted the use of subcontracting for ghting corruption in this eld, but EU actors have advocated for a less restrictive use of it. Originality/value – The originality of this study was to analyze subcontracting both in light of competition and corruption issues as two sides that cannot be dealt with separately. As the Italian experience has shown, authorities in these elds can gain a lot from their collaboration.