Genealogia della normatività. La normatività come controllo

Abstract

In this paper I draw the outline of a psychological genealogy of normativity: an account of normativity as a complex neuro-psychological fact, entirely analysable in non-normative terms. As a first step, I introduce two of the main problems faced by the genealogical approach. I call the first one “Gibbard problem”: what kind of neuro-psychological state is normative judgment? I call the second one “irreducibility of normativity problem”: normative dynamics seem to be irreducible to causal dynamics. As a second step, I examine the “dual model” of the psychology of normative judgment developed by J. Haidt and J. Greene. I argue that the dual model is not able to solve the aforementioned problems. However, it points at the right direction. Moving from the conceptual framework and the difficulties outlined in the discussion of the dual model, I eventually propose an alternative model, the “model of control”. According to this model, normative guidance consists of a network of recursive control processes. Normative judgment is the conscious mental state we access when the relevant control process is completed. Reasons and norms are parameters that causally guide the process.